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INTERGENERATIONAL CONSUMER WELFARE IN DYNAMIC COMMODITY MARKETS
By Greg Hertzler^
In conunodity markets, both prices and the cohorts of con
sumers change over time. Previous stabilization literature
applied to changing generations incorporates a preference for
inequity, does not require those generations who gain from lower
prices to compensate those who lose, and assumes instability
which preserves arithmetic mean prices. This paper examines
preferences for both equity and specific forms of inequity, en
forces actual Income compensation to make the Pareto criterion
applicable, and Includes both arithmetic and geometric mean pre
serving price instability. Previous stabilization conclusions
are recast into a dynamic context and new ordinal criteria based
upon demand and expenditure functions are derived.
I, Introduction
The analysis of consumer welfare In the presence of supply induced price
instability has a long and controversial history. Theoretically valid meas
ures are difficult to obtain even while policies roust be implemented which
require quantification of benefits and costs. Consumer surplus as the area
under a Marshalllan demand curve has been used extensively to approximate the
areas under compensated demand curves. Currle, et. al» [71» presents a
survey of surplus measures and Wlllig (^] places bounds upon the measurement
errors. Hausman [U] integrates Marshalllan demands to obtain indirect
utility and expenditure functions from which compensated demands are derived.
Hanoch [9] and Turnovsky. et. al, [^1 discuss surplus measures as special
cases of the more general convexity/concavity criterion of the indirect
utility function. Vartia l^] presents algorithms for computing income com
pensations which avoid the path dependence problems of line integration ia
surplus computations.
Surplus measures were first proposed to analyze discrete policy alterna
tives. For example, a public works project must compare equilibrium without
the project to equilibrium If the project were completed. It is not obvious,
however, that criteria for static equilibria always apply to dynamic com
modity markets as they evolve over time. Two critical assumptions in the
static theory of consumer welfare will be relaxed in this paper.
First, prices are usually defined to be symmetrically distributed.
Randomness in production such as the effects of weather on agricultural crops
is a justification often cited- The dynamic analog to symmetrically distri
buted prices is a set of differential equations for price movements which
preserve the arithmetic means. Other forms of price instability may be more
appropriate in different circimistances. Preserving the geometric means may
better model dynamic commodity markets with differential equations in terms
of rates of change. Geometric mean preserving prices were proposed by
Fleming, et. al, [8] and are discussed by Turnovsky, et. al. [^1- An em
pirically correct definition of price instability will prove to be crucial in
drawing welfare conclusions.
A second assumption of previous welfare theory treats consumers as a
single group. Actually, cohorts of consumers continually change as they are
born, age, and die. Although there is overlapping, each instantaneous gen
eration will differ from every other- Consumers who enjoy lower prices are
not all the same as those who may later be penalized with hif^her prices.
Difficult issues of intergeneratlonal comparisons through preferences for
equity or some form of inequity, and questions of income compensation between
generations must be addressed.
In this paper the life-cycle components of individual consumer decisions
are ignored. Instead utilities of different generations will be combined in
the context of a social welfare function. Welfare by definition of Bergson
[3] and Harsanyi [^) Is a functional composite of Individual utilities. If
a cross section of all Individuals at an Instant of time meets the conditions
of Muellbauer [^] and aggregates into a consistent market, the social wel
fare function becomes a weighted siun of each generation's aggregate utility.
Although the implications of various choices for the intergeneratlonal
welfare weights can be explored, the ultimate choice is an ethical decision
for the researcher. One choice might be a strict preference for equity.
Another choice might Incorporate a time preference either for the present or
the future. Traditionally, all welfare weights are implicitly assumed to be
equal. Though time neutral, this is still a preference for a specific kind
of inequity, and, unless income Is actually transferred Co Chose who musC pay
higher prices, instability Is Pareto noncomparable. Some consumers will
prefer stability while others prefer instability, A transfer mechanism, as
proposed by Hicks [^] and Kaldor [IJtJ » designed in this study to admit
Pareto comparisons under preferences for inequity.
There is considerable debate whether social welfare is cardinal or ordi
nal, While demand theory is able to assume ordinal coiraiodity preferences
because demand functions are independent of any monotomic transformations of
utility, it is not clear whether intensity of preferences should be excluded
from welfare considerations. Arrow [1] has taken an ordinal approach and has
been criticized by Hildreth [H]. In this paper, cardinality must be assumed
when the Pareto criterion does not apply. Otherwise, ordinality is suffi
ciently strong.
An important point to emphasize is that welfare analysis in commodity
markets may require different assumptions for different situations. The
researcher must implicitly or explicitly assign welfare weights to genera
tions and decide what kinds of income compensation may be appropriate.
Finally it will be necessary to empirically determine the best definition of
price instability and possibly estimate a demand system.
Several conclusions are derived in this paper which place previous
welfare results in context. Welfare improvements frcm instability are
possible only when society prefers inequity between generations. With
inequity, the welfare measure of choice is the Pareto criterion. Pareto
comparable and ordinal welfare comparisons are performed in this paper by
requiring those who gain from instability to actually compensate those who
would otherwise lose. When previous welfare results are applied to changing
generations, cardinal interpersonal comparisons are required because some
consumers gain at the expense of others.
To give an overview of the paper, Section 2 details the assumptions to
be made and derives a dynamic measure of changes in welfare over time. Sec
tion 3 considers possible choices of welfare weights. Two forms of price
instability are defined in Section 4. Section 5 specifies functional forms
for income compensation between generations. An expanded representation of
the linear expenditure system is presented in Section 6 to allow for risk
aversion, risk neutrality, or risk affinity in determining the convexity/con-
cavity properties of indirect utility# The main body of conclusions is
contained in Section 7 where various combinations of preferences for
equity/inequity, price changes, income compensations, and risk preferences
are analyzed. Finally a brief summary follows in Section 8,
2. Welfare Changes over Time
Several assumptions will be made In specifying a social welfare func
tion. These are: 1) Both prices and generations of consumers change con
tinuously over time; 2) Each generation spans only an instant and aggregates
consistently into a cross sectional market whose utility does not depend upon
the utility levels of previous or future generations; 3) Social welfare is
the weighted sum of utilities over generations; 4) income Is exogenous al
though transfers of income may be endogenously determined; 5) The commodity
choice set is fixed and Is the same for each generation.
From these assumptions it follows that each generation's utility is time
independent and can be weighted and added to the utility of all other genera
tions. Moreover, individual utilities are time additive because each person
belongs to more than one instantaneous generation. Further, the analysis is
only partial, with income determination and productive decisions given.
The policy analyst studying price instability would wish to
« -5^t
(1) Maximize W» / e fl^U(q,^,. •.,
t=0 t IL "I.
subject to
(2) ^ ^
where W Is total social welfare, U is the utility function of each represen
tative individual which is twice continuously differentiable, strictly
Increasing, and strictly quasi-concave, is the population within each
generation, y is per capita income, i^lj-'-tO are commodity prices,
-6 t
q.^, i«l,...,n are per capita demand functions, and e is a weighting
factor assigned to each individual within a generation. Population cancels
frcan both sides of the aggregate budget constraint, equation 2, and may grow
at an exogenous rate tu. It can be rewritten as > with the welfare
((i)-6^)t
weights for each generation becoming
Life cycle aspects of the consxaner decision problem are ignored,
combining time and equity preferences in the same discount factor. Problems
can arise if w-6^ is nonnegative, as discussed by Wan l^]* Briefly stated,
convergence is assured only if negative. Whenever
> 0, future weights will become infinitely large as t approaches
infinity. If == 0» convergence Is difficult to check and it becomes
impossible to distinguish between alternate time paths as t Increases, In
this study, u>-6^ will be either positive, zero, or negative and a criterion
for measuring changes in welfare must be developed which is not constrained
by convergence problems.
The time additivity assumption allows welfare at each instant of time to
be expressed as the LaGrangian
(3) "t = + Vyt-^PktikP• ^
with the marginal social welfare of income.
First order conditions of 3 can be solved for demands "it-
each instant of time t and substituted Into direct utility, to give
the indirect utility function, VCp^., Yj.)» inverse, the expenditure
function, m(V^, p^). Welfare in turn is an unconstrained function of
indirect utility,
(uj-6 )t
(3') " V v(p^^....,p^^.yj.).
The time derivative of 3* is
(4) dt ° at
(tj-6 )t 3V ,
- a^e [(co-Sj. - '
where 5^, p^^^,, i'=l,.P.,n and y^ are derivatives with respect to time.
Equation 4 gives the direction of change in welfare, dW^/dt. The problem of
"many surpluses" does not arise. Burns [5, 6] and Silberberg [1^1 discuss
the path dependence of line integrals as it relates especially to
compensating and equivalent variations. If dW^ were desired, path dependence
in A could be avoided by completely defining the time paths of prices and
income. In this study, prices and income vary simultaneously and
continuously according to differential equations. Price instability is
socially preferred or not depending upon whether welfare is convex or concave
with respect to time. Convexity is determined by comparing the slopes of
welfare at different points in time.
As it is written. Equation A can be applied in arbitrarily complex
situations. Structural relationships for welfare weights between
generations, price movements, income compensations, and even indirect utility
can be imposed to draw specific conclusions. The more restrictions, the
less general the conclusions will be-
For example, suppose income was constant, prices either increased or
decreased over time in a way which preserved the arithmetic means, and all
welfare weights were equal. Then y^ , n and 6^ would be zero, and the
direction of change in welfare. dW^/dt, would depend only upon positive or
negative price changes, p^^ , i-l,...,n , multiplied by marginal indirect
utilities, 9V /9p , i=l,...,n. These are the assumptions of previous price
stabilization literature recast into the present dynamic context. Of the
infinite variety of possible assumptions, the following sections will analyze
a few of the most interesting,
3. Choice of Welfare Weights
A (Laspeyres type) cost of living index is denoted by the expenditure
ratio m(VQ, Pj.)/m(VQ, p^^). Expenditures for fixed utility level are
compared at initial prices, p^, and later prices, p^. By analogy, a true
"util" of living index is the ratio V(p^, y)/V(pQ, y)• For a fixed income,
utility at initial prices, p^, is compared to utility at later prices, p^. A
generation which gains (loses) from price changes will have a util index
greater than (less than) unity.
The point of view with a strict preference for equity will require
relative welfare weights to be inversely related to the utll index,
1 ^t^
Cw - <5 ;t " vCpq, yQ) '
e
where income, y^, is allowed to vary over time. Equation 5 implies =
(u)-5 )t
e V^. As utility changes it is continuously discounted or compounded
until every generation contributes equally to social welfare•
Other points of view embody a preference for inequity. Affinity for the
present, time neutrality, and affinity for the future prevail whenever
relative welfare weights are decreasing, constant, or increasing over time,
respectively. Welfare weights can be assumed to grow at constant rate (i>-6
and
(6) 1
when aj-5 <=> 0. With a preference for inequity, generations do not
contribute equally to social welfare.
4. Price Changes over Time
Two classes of differential equations would appear to be the most useful
in defining price instability, i.e., prices which preserve the arithmetic
means, and prices which preserve the geometric means. Two further
10
assumptions are made. 1) Prices change within the time interval, t e [0, 1]
2) Those prices which do change move in the same direction over this
interval, either increasing or decreasing.
Of a wide class of differential equations which would preserve the
arithmetic means, perhaps the simplest is
(7) Pi,
where c^ Is a constant, either positive or negative. Prices obeying 7 are
uniformly distributed and will be termed arithmetic mean preserving, (AMP)-
With p^Q being the initial price of each commodity 1, the differential
equations (probability densities) in 7 have the solutions (distributions)
(8) Pit = PlO
Vfhere t e [0,11 • At time t=l/2, price equals the arithmetic mean of
all prices, p^^ + l/2c^, i=l,.«.,n.
A. set of differential equations expressed as rates of change is
(9) Pit = ( i*"l, • • • •
This form of price instability has skewed distributions which will be termed
geometric mean preserving, (GMP), The solutions (distributions) for differ
ential equations (probability densities) in 9 are
11
(10) Pit=PiO« '^'.
1/2C^
Price equals the geometric means of all prices, Pj^Q® *
i® 1 y • • • >Ti •
The arithmetic mean for a given set of prices can be compared to the
geometric mean of the same prices by the inequality
1
T T Pit^^
(11) , (1=1.....").
where T-1, The arithmetic mean of a set of prices always exceeds the geo
metric mean of the same prices unless they are stable and
Such a comparison is misleading, however, because the time paths of
prices generated by 8 will differ from those generated by 10 and they cannot
be directly compared. Given initial price Pj|^ Q and arbitrary constant c^,
(12) + c^t <-> (1=1,....n).
Only if prices are stable with c^O, i«l,##.,n, are AMP and GMP time paths
equal. Whether AMP prices exceed GMP prices or not depends upon the magni
tudes of p^Q and t, and the magnitude and sign of .
5. Income Changes over Time
A simplification in much of the price stabilization literature is the
assumption of a stable income, i.e.,
12
(13)
and
(14) Yt = 0
where y is a constant.
Price changes over time may be Pareto noncomparable if the generations
paying higher prices prefer stability while the generations paying lower
prices prefer instability. Pareto comparability is assured if an income
transfer mechanism requires those who gain to actually compensate those who
lose. If each generation is endowed with a fixed income, y, the utility that
would prevail at stabilized prices is V(p, y) where p is a vector of either
arithmetic or geometric mean prices. For the two kinds of price instability
discussed in the previous section, '
First assume k<n prices are rising in the interval t e [0,1] making
c^>0, 1-1,...,k in 7. 8. 9, and 10, and P^q<P.i. Between times t £[1/2,1]
generations will tend to prefer mean prices since indirect utility is
nonincreaslng in prices. I.e., The amount of additional Income
required to make them indifferent between stable and higher prices is
y^=m(Vj^/2, ^1/2^ ^t negative of compensating
variation. Similarly, when prices are falling, c^< 0 and p^Q> p^^^-
Generations of consumers in the Interval t e [0, 1/2] will require
compensation Pt '^®^^l/2' ^1/2 '^ course this compensation must
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be paid by the generations benefiting from lower prices. When c^> 0, these
consumers are In the time Interval t e [0. 1/2]. When c < 0, they reside In
t e [1/2, 11 .
For rising prices, the income transfer mechanism is
(15a) Yt = y-yi-t =
- 2m(Vj/2'Pi/2^"® '^*'l/2'Pl-t '^ [0,1/2], c^>0. (i=l,....k).
(15b) « y+Yt y-^CV^^2>Pt^"®^^l/2»Pl/2^
- ni(Vj^y2'Pt '^ ^ ^ [1/2.1]. Cj>0, (i-l,...,lc).
The transfer mechanism decreases income when prices are lower in the
interval t e [0,1/2], while income in the interval t e [1/2,U is Increased.
Notice the time subscripts in 15a require consumers paying the lowest prices,
p i»l,...,lc to compensate those paying the highest prices, "ir
flfl no compensation is paid.
The changes over time of I5a and 15b are
(16a) y^ =-yf_t =Y"spj'(^!^{"'^ ^Pj(l-t)' ^10.1/2). Ci>0, (1=1 k),
MV,/,, P^). ^ (i-l,...,k).
(16b)
^ . -c , p.,, t e [1/2,11, Ci>0,
t t j ''Pjt
Conversely, when prices are high initially and falling, the transfer
mechanism is
lA
(17a) « y+y^ = l/2'^l/l^
" ®^Vl/2»Pt^* ^ ^ [0,1/2], Cj^<0, (i=l,...,k),
(17b) y^. = y-Vi-t " y"®<Vj/2»Pl-t^'^^^l/2'Pl/2^
- 2in(Vj^^2»Pl/2^"™^"^l/2'Pl-t '^ ^ ^ [1/2.1), c^<0, (1=1...,.k).
Taking derivatives,
(18a) Yt " ~ Pf ^ ^ [0,1/2] , Cj^CO, (1=1,... ,k),
(18b) yj. " Yi-t ~"j—^P*(1 t) ^ ^^ ^[1/2,1], c^<0, (1=1,.•.,k).
By definition, y^=Tn(V^,p^) , but for rising prices in 15b, ^^^^^1/2'^ t^ '
This Implies ^ ^ [1/2,11 and c^>0, 1=1,.-.,k. Conversely,
falling prices, ^^^0, 1=1,,..,k, and t e [0,1/2] in 17a imply ^h®®®
generations who would otherwise lose from instability are compensated to the
point of indifference between stability and instability.
6. Functional Forms for Demand Systems
In most cases, it will be necessary to specify a demand system before
applied welfare conclusions can be reached. The welfare problem as defined
in this study assumes consistent cross sectional aggregations within each
generation of consumers. Consistency requires a price independent general
ized linear expenditure function (PIGL) as formulated by Muellbauer [l^l-
hfembers of the PIGL class must satisfy
15
(19a) mCV^.Pt) = Yt = [a(p)"^+h(Vj.)b(pt) € * 0,
(19b) In Tn(V^.,Pj.) = In y^. = In a(p)+h(V^)ln b(pj.), e == Q,
where a(p^) and b(p^) are functions of prices, b(V^) is a monotonic
transformation of utility, and e is a parameter. Acommon member of the FIGL
class is the linear expenditure system (LES). The LES is derivable from the
additive Stone-Geary direct utility function as discussed by Phlips [17).
Direct additivity implies restrictions on the substitutability between
commodities which will be exploited in the examples of Section 7 to draw a
priori conclusions. The welfare measures to be derived could just as easily
apply to other demand systems. However, any flexible functional forms will
almost surely need to be estimated before conclusions are possible.
When e --1 in 19a, expenditures are linear. Further assumptions of LES
are
(20) a(p^.) =
(21) 0 < CL^< qj^» 0 < (i®l»•••»n)f
(22) h(V^) = u > 0,
where u is a strictly positive parameter.
Equation 20 gives specific functional forms for a(p^) and b(p^). Res
trictions on parameters necessary to meet the condition of negativity of the
16
direct substitution effect. Slutaky symmetry, and adding up are shown in 21.
Equation 22 contains the assumptions about transformation h. It is usual to
V
let h(V )~e but the modified transformation in 22 is more flexible and
& *
allows the meaaurement of cardinal risk preferences.
Salient properties of the modified LES are
(23) oi(v^,p^) - yt = npjj,
J J
(24) VCpt-.Yt) =
j"Pj4
, Of Si s(25) ^ ^ •
1(26) "5^ "
(i*ly•••»n),
(i=l,...,n),(27) qi(Vt.Pit) =75^ = npjJ) -p^.
-3Vt/9Pit V ^i(28) qi(Pit.yt> = 5Vj./9y,. " ai+(y^.-EajPjt)
-31nOV./3y.)oxiivov^/
(29) Pt = 51n ^ - (l-v)y^_s:^^^p.^.
( i~ I f • • • »n) I
17
(30) n^t 31n Pit^it'
where q » i-l....,n are demand functions, is the income elasticity of the
it
marginal utility of income, and i«l.....n are inccHie elasticities of
demand.
All of the parameters are known once ordinal demand functions are esti
mated, except 0 which must be determined separately, as discussed by lianoch
[9]. The elasticity of marginal utility, p^,, was first proposed by Arrow 12]
and Pratt [18] as the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Measurements of
p are discussed in Luce and Suppes [15] and experimentally obtained by
Binswanger I^], Once values for p^ are known, u can be estimated.
When 0<u<l, u-1. and u>l. p>0. p=0. and p<0 respectively, and consumers
have risk aversion, risk neutrality, or risk affinity. For fixed u, 0<u<l,
p recedes from infinity as income , increases beyond subsistence level,
E a p . and in the limit equals 1-u. In other words, there is decreasing
j j jt'
relative risk aversion, or, intuitively, generations of consumer with less
income will be less inclined to prefer price instability.
7. Changes in Consumer Welfare under Selected Restrictions
Avery general statement of changes in consumer welfare is contained in
Equation 4. This section will obtain more specific results by Imposing
selected restrictions.
Time Preference for Equity
Awidely applicable conclusion follows when a preference for equity in
18
Equation 5 prevails. Inverting 5, and taking logarithms, (w fi^)t InV^-lnV^.
which, when differentiated, becomes
(31)
Combining 5, 31, and 4,
(32) ^ = =
Proposition 1: When there is a preference for equity, neither price
instability nor income changes will change social welfare, regardless of the
form of indirect utility. Conversely, increases or decreases in welfare
require a preference for some form of inequity.
Interpretation of Proposition 1 must be done carefully. It simply
states that, if all generations count equally, social welfare is constant.
It does not preclude price instability from which some generations may gain
and some may lose. Presumably, those ^o prefer equity would also stabilize
prices and/or implement income transfer mechanisms to equalize utilities over
all generations. Proposition 1 says nothing about the level of total welfare
given different price and income changes.
Whenever utility is constant over time, the preference for equity degen
erates into time neutrality with zero. Constant utility requires
i:.(3V /8p. )p j.+(3V^/3y^)y^=0 which becomes y^= Ep^^q^^ using Roy's Theorem.
By definition, y^ = q^^ + * implying i-l,....n, and
making demands, , constant. Vartia [2^1 presents algorithms for
19
approximating constant demand differential equations In Income Co an
arbitrary degree of accuracy. Drawing upon Vartia's results, the following
proposition is presented for completeness with very little elaboration.
Proposition 2: When there is a preference either for equity or time
neutrality and generations are compensated to maintain constant utility,
consumers prefer price instability if constant income compensated demands,
exceed constant demands at stable prices. Otherwise, consumers are indiff
erent or prefer stability. This is an ordinal and Pareto comparable result.
The income compensation mechanisms of this study are easy to solve in
closed form because they are anchored to the reference level of utility,
^1/2' also happens to be the level of utility at stable prices. If
some generations gain while others are indifferent, it would be possible to
increase compensation so that all gain equally. However, once demands are
compensated to be constant over all generations, welfare is constant over
time for both stable and unstable prices, and there is no common reference
level of utility. An approximation algorithm such as Vartia's becomes
necessary to quantify benefits.
Pareto Noncomparability, Time Neutrality, and AMP Prices
When there is a preference for Inequity and no compensation between
generations is enforced, the Pareto criterion does not apply. All welfare
weights will be set equal in Equation 6. Price changes are defined in 7,
with constant income as in 14. The convexity/concavity of W^. can be deter
mined by evaluating differences in the slope, dW^/dt, at two arbitrary
points, t=l and t=0.
dw. ,1 av. 1(33) ^ Ig -
20
3V, 3Vn
Equation 33 Is a second order condition which is positive for convex
over time. When there are n prices, any subset, k, 0<k.<n, of those prices
can be unstable. For the important case of k=l, c^^O, and C2=C2=,••••
Convexity/concavity of social welfare depends upon the convexity/concavity
In of indirect utility. - If is linear in price p^^,, =
aVo/piQ. and society is indifferent between stable and unstable . Because
is nonincreasing in prices with 3V^/3p^^<0, whenever is convex in p^^
marginal utilities will differ and at least one of them will be negative. An
increase in price p^^ requires Cj^>0, I ^ ^
av^/3Pj^qOV^/SPj^j^<0, Equation 33 is positive because 3Vq/3Pj^q dominates and
is negative. Similarly, when c^<0, ^^S^in 33
is positive.
More than one price can be unstable, l<k.<n, in which case may be
convex in all k prices. Hanoch [9] and Turnovsky, et. al. [^] give suffi
cient but not necessary conditions for indirect utility to be convex, and
cite conventional surplus measures as a special case. The static result
translated into the present dynamic context is summarized as:
Proposition 3: When there is a preference for time neutrality, there is
no compensation between generations, and both stable and unstable prices
preserve the same arithmetic means, price instability is socially preferred
if indirect utility is strictly convex in the unstable prices. This is a
cardinal and Pareto noncomparable result because some generations of con~
sumers are harmed•
21
The traditional wisdom holding conswers to prefer supply induced price
instability embodies the assumptions of Proposition 3, especially cardinality
and AMP prices, and the empirical statement that indirect utility is usually
convex. Marginal indirect utility for the LES in 25 can be substituted into
33 to give
(34) ="OlfVo(^ + +-5^))o,] .
= ^ +Vop.Q - '
where, to conserve notation, 5^^ is^t* +
^3=k+i«jPjf ^0 "i
If all prices are stable, k=0 and c^=0, 1=1,.••,n. Welfare will not
change over time. If some prices are unstable, c^>0, 1=1,and welfare
is unconditionally convex with respect to time if consumers have either risk
neutrality or risk affinity. This is shown by examining two cases.
First, let c^>0, P^Q<P^y* i=l,....k, and Vq>V^. The second terra in the
summation, dominate the fourth term, As long as
u>l, the first term will dominate the third, because
Equation 34 is positive. Conversely^ if ^^<0, Pio^Pil*
u>l, the fourth term will dominate the second, and the third will dominate
the first. The result multiplied by negative c^ again makes 34 positive.
22
Corollary 3a: Consumers with risk neutrality or risk affinity always
gain under the conditions of Proposition 3, Riven the linear expenditure
system.
If some prices increased while others decreased, in 34
could either increase, decrease, or remain unchanged. For this reason, all
prices are assumed to move in the same direction. When consumers are risk
averse 0<u<l. and the first and third terras cannot be compared without
estimates of the demand parameters and and risk coefficient p^.
The sufficient conditions for convexity of Turnovsky, et, al. t2£]
require all income elasticities of demand, to be equal for the k
commodities with unstable prices and equal to unity if k=n. Thus
i=l,...,k<n, and n,=l if k»n. Consumers will gain from price instability if
2ti >p . This condition is more likely to be met for income inelastic
Ic ^
commodities and low degrees of risk aversion. For p^<0 it is always met,
independently verifying Corollary 3a. although Corollary 3a does not require
common income elasticities of demand.
Pareto Noncomparabllity, Time Neutrality, and CMP Prices
Equal welfare weights in 6, price changes preserving the geometric means
as in 9, and constant income according to 14 give
dW. I 9V 1
3V, 3V«
WTiereas Equation 33 is positive whenever indirect utility is convex in
prices, Equation 35 is positive whenever indirect utility is convex in the
23
logarithm of prices. This is noted by the fact 3V^/31n « ^^^t^^^it^^it*
i'1(••• )n•
Proposition 4: When there is a preference for time neutrality, there is
no compensation between generations, and both stable and unstable prices
preserve the same geometric means, price instability Is socially preferred if
indirect utility is strictly convex in the logarithms of unstable prices.
This is a cardinal and Pareto noncomparable result because some generations
of consumers are harmed.
In 33, it was shown consumers could gain if some prices are rising,
Ci>0. i=l,...,k. because 9Vq/9p^qOVj^/3p^j<0. However, for positive
and rising prices, decrease in absolute value relative to
(3V^/3p^^)p^j^. Similarly, for falling prices, c^<0, ^iO^^il'
(3Vj^/3p^^)p^j^ will decrease relative to ^ ^PiO^^iO' same margi
nal utilities, it is possible for 33 to be positive and 35 negative.
Corollary Aa: Consumers will be less likely to prefer geometric mean
preserving price instability than arithmetic mean preserving instability.
One unambiguous case can be observed as u approaches zero in the LES.
Indirect utility, V^, will approach unity in 24, and marginal indirect
utility in 25 will approach j^jPj^i^^it^* Equation 35
approaches
X ,(36) ^1 = - 3j)cjl .
0 i y ^0 y ^1
When prices are increasing, c^>0, Pj^Q^P^^* ^nd the summation
in 36 is negative. When prices are decreasing, ^iO^^il'
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the sunnaation is again, negative. Multiplied by a very small positive U
change in welfare is very near zero, but negative.
Corollary 4b; Very risk averse consumers can never gain from geometric
mean preserving price instability, given the linear expenditure system.
Pareto Comparability, Time Neutrality, and AMP Prices
Enforcing compensation between generations will allow welfare rankings
by the Pareto criterion. Roy's Theorem and Shepard's Lemma in the form
-3V^/3p_ -OV^/3y.)q_ = OV /3y )3m /3p . i=l,...,n, are applied in the
C LC t U 1. W U L L L
following derivations. It is also necessary to find
16a and 18b. Substituting 1-t for t in Equation 8, ~
for arithmetic mean preserving prices. With equal welfare weights in 6, AMP
price changes from 7, changes in compensated income for increasing prices
from 16a and 16b, the difference in the changes in welfare becomes
(37a)
dW 1
^Iq
3V. 3V. 3ni(V, 1/2
aVf oVf 3m(V,/j, p^) ,
3Vi 3Vi 3m(V,. p,)^ ^
- i)Pj\ ^
3V^ 3m(Vi,p,
3V
^03yQ f ^^1^' ^i^ '^ (i'*!»*• ♦ »k) ,
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where increasing prices, A completely analogous derivation for
falling prices and the compensation mechanism of 18a and 18b gives
dW. 1 3V
(37b) (1=1.•••.«•
For falling prices, « ^1/2' generations
paying higher prices have been compensated to make thera indifferent between
stable and unstable prices. By the Pareto criterion, welfare is convex, with
37a and 37b positive, if the generations benefitting from low prices can pay
compensation and still gain. Notice the magnitudes of 37a and 37b depend
upon cardinal marginal utilities of income, but the signs of 37a and 37b
depend only upon a relative price change weighted sum of differences in ordi
nal demand functions, and 1=1,.. ,,1^.
Propositon 5: When there is a preference for time neutrality, genera
tions who would otherwise lose are compensated to the point of indifference
and both stable and unstable prices preserve the same arithmetic means, price
instability is socially preferred if the relative price change weighted sum
of quantities demanded by generations paying both lower prices and compensa
tion exceeds the relative price change weighted sum of quantities demanded by
generations paying higher prices but receiving compensation. Otherwise con
sumers are either indifferent or prefer stability. This is an ordinal and
Pareto comparable result because no generations of consumers are harmed.
To achieve further insight into the effects of compensation, the
uncompensated cardinal measure in 33 can be rewritten as
26
dw. 1 av« av.
the sign of which depends upon differences in the marginal utilities of
income* Compensation in 37a and 37b eliminates the effects of different
marginal utilities of income by varying Income itself.
Equations 37a and 37b are easy to apply. Given the expenditure and
indirect utility functions, compensated demands are known once ordinary
demands are estimated. Further, the expenditure function at fixed levels of
indirect utility gives compensated incomes as functions of mean income, mean
and extreme prices. In particular, for LES expenditures in 23, increasing
AMP prices in 7, and compensation as in 15a and 15b,
(38a) yo - Xq = 2(Ei/2+v}//^IIi/2)-^rVl^2Hl-^0
- 'i^/2(2ni/2-"i>
(38b) yj - Ej =.
where for AHP prices. Substituting marginal utility of income
and demand functions from 26, 27, and 28, incorporating 38a and 38b, and
noting i=l,...,n, 37a becomes
dW , B.
(39a) ^1 1 = flo"Vol 1
27
l/2~"i Pjl J
p—)c^ ]
31T^/3p.^ 3II,/3p.-i
' Hq ~
The Cobb-Douglas type function, is negative semidefinite in its
linearly homogenous form dictated by 21. Thus,
increasing prices, and 39a is
always nonnegative. Parallel derivations for falling prices transform 37b
into
dWj. j
(39b) (1=11,.,.,k),
where '^^ il falling prices and c^<0,
i=l,...,k, 39b is also nonnegative.
Corollary 5a; Consumers never lose under the conditions of Proposition
5, given the linear expenditure system.
The ordinal welfare criteria in 37a and 37b can be applied with any
demand system, though flexible functional forms impose very few restrictions.
A priori conclusions may be difficult, and demand parameters may first need
to be estimated.
Pareto Comparability, Time Neutrality, and GMP Prices
The welfare effects of geometric mean preserving price instability can
also be derived. In this case, prices change non-linearly over time. The
form of compensation mechanisms 16a and 18b is found by substi-
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tuting 1-t for t in 10, or Combining this
result with equal welfare weights in 6 and compensation for rising prices
from 16a and 16b, the difference in the direction of change in welfare is
(40a)
dW. 1 3V^ 3ro(V,;2.Pl-t>
av. 3V^ 3m(Vw2>Pt^ i 1
+ 11/2
3Vi 3V, am(V,,p,) ^ ,
- "olfTp^jl 5pji ' Pjl>'=j'
aVf, 3V„ m(V, ,p,)
- Pjl
9V
with increasing prices. The analogous derivation for falling
prices gives
(40b) HT^Iq ~ ?^PjO'lj^^O»PO^~Pj » ^i^O, (i=l,...,k).
where ^q'^ ^y/2 falling prices.
Proposition 6; When there is preference for time neutrality, genera
tions who would otherwise lose are compensated to the point of indifference,
and both stable and unstable prices preserve the same geometric means, price
Instability is socially preferred if the relative price growth weighted sum
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of expenditures by generations paying both lower prices and compensation
exceeds the relative price growth weighted sum of expenditures by generations
paying higher prices but receiving compensation. Otherwise, consumers are
indifferent or prefer stability. This is an ordinal and Pareto comparable
result because no generations of consumers are harmed.
When there are nonlinear and increasing GMP prices in the LES, 15a and
15b give
(Ala) yo - So =
= vJ^^(2ni/2-iii)+2!:i/2-(i:i+i:o)
(41b) yi -
=
It follows from Ala and Alb that prices are increas
ing, 2n^^2<2n^, ^^l/2~"l^"l' prices are
convex over time. Neither become negative, and 0<yQ-
Substituting for marginal utility of income and demands from 26, 27, and
28, AOa becomes
1 P4r\a. .(42a) ^1^ =«o-Vo[|(^
30
With rising prices, Pig^^^il * i*l»-**A
difference in the direction of change in welfare negative in 42a. Similar
derivations for falling GMP prices transform 40b into
(42b) -^1^ =%yVi[|(3q4xj^<Pjo-PjlH^j<|^ ^>>^jl' ^i<®' (i=l,-..,k).
In this case, i=l,.«.,k and Multiplier c^ is
negative and 42b is always negative.
Corollary 6a: Consumers always lose from instability under the condi
tions of Proposition 6 and prefer stability, given the linear expenditure
system.
A comparison of Corollaries 5a and 6a emphasizes the Importance of an
empirically correct definition price instability. If there were a single
composite commodity, n=l and 40a and 40b become
dW. 1 3Vfx(40a') =«o ^ tyo-yilct, Ci>0, (1-1),
dW. 1 SV(40b') ^1^ =Qq "5^ [yo-yi^i. Ci<0.
By the compensation mechanism of 15a and 15b, ^ rising price,
c^>0, making 40a' negative. By 17a and 17b, y^>y^ ^ falling price, c^<0,
with 40b'' also negative.
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Corollary 6b: When there Is a single composite commodity, consumers
always lose under the conditions of Proposition 6 and prefer stability.
Time Preferences and Pareto Comparability
If there is a social preference either for the present of the future,
the relative welfare weights of generations will decline or rise over time,
respectively in Equation 6, It will be assumed causing
welfare weights to grow or decline at a constant rate. For increasing AMP
prices and ccmpensation between generations, 4 becomes
dW 1 ( fi\
(43a) =S!g[(<^-6)(e '^^ °^Vj-VQ)]
^^0 (i=l,.».,k).
Equation 43a is equivalent to 37a with the addition of the first term
involving nonzero ai-6. When AMP prices are falling with to-fi nonzero, the
analog of 37b is
(43b)
9 V+ Jlge^^ j(Vq »PQ)"q j(pj^ »y p )Cj ], c^<0, (i=l,. *•,k) .
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dW dW.
t 0 ^ A
The point of indifference for stable prices is no longer " dt '
but rather
(44) ^1^ - no[(ai-6)(e('^ «)Tf-V)]
which happens Co be zero only when ki-6=Q. and is positive otherwise. If, in
either 43a or 43b, qiQ-qn. i=l then V„=V^=V, and consumers are in
different between instability in whichever of 43a or 43b applies and stabili-
ty in 44•
When there are rising prices c^>0, PiQ^Pil* ®social prefer
ence for the present, [»)-6<0, and if
a preference for the present with currently low but rising prices will
amplify the benefits of instability. Conversely, if there are falling
prices, c^<0, Pio>Pil' ^ preference for the future, t^6>0, and if
qiO<qi^, i=l,.,,.k in 43b. then and a preference for the future with
currently high and falling prices will amplify the benefits of instability.
Proposition 7: When generations who would otherwise lose are compen
sated to the point of indifference, and both stable and unstable prices pre
serve the same arithmetic means, either i) a preference for the present with
rising prices, or ii) a preference for the future with falling prices will
tend to make instability socially more desirable than if the time preference
was neutral. This is an ordinal and Pareto comparable result.
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The two cases of Increasing prices with a preference for the future and
decreasing prices with a preference for the present give ambiguous
results.
Summary
In commodity markets, prices actually change over time. Cohorts of
consumers are born, age, and die, and although there is overlapping, the
consumers in the instantaneous generations enjoying lower prices are not all
the aanif* as those who are penalized by higher prices. This paper first
presents a completely general method for theoretically and empirically
measuring social welfare changes from dynamic price instability in commodity
markets. Then four categories of restrictions are applied to draw specific
conclusions. These categories consider 1) the social preference relating
generations of consumers through time, 2) the empirical form of price
changes, 3) actual income compensations between generations who gain and
generations who lose, and 4) the form of the indirect utility function.
The welfare measures discussed are classified according to whether they
embody a preference for equity or a preference for inequity. Preferences for
inequity are further classified by their affinity for the present, time
neutrality, or affinity for the future. Each of these Inequity preferences
can be subdivided according to whether the Pareto welfare criterion applies
or not. Finally, different forms of price instability may apply to either
Pareto comparable or Pareto noncoraparable situations.
Several conclusions are reached. When a preference for equity prevails,
each generation contributes equally and social welfare is constant over time.
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Although price and income movements may actually alter each generation s
utility, generations with higher utility levels are not allowed to influence
social welfare more than generations with lower utility- Although not
considered in detail, income compensation mechanisms can be constructed to
equalize utilities. In this case, instability is socially preferred when
constant income compensated demands exceed constant demands from stable
prices•
A change in social welfare over time requires a preference for some form
of inequity. When inequity is preferred, the time preference is neutral, and
there is no compensation between generations, welfare measurement is inher
ently Pareto noncomparable. Those who pay lower prices will prefer Insta
bility, while those who pay higher prices will prefer stability. Unless
marginal utility of income happens to be constant, measurement is also cardi
nal. In this category, traditional welfare results assuming arithmetic mean
preserving prices, are confirmed in a dynamic context, and the analysis
expanded to include geometric mean preserving prices. Consumers are found to
prefer AMP over GMP prices,
Pareto comparable and ordinal criteria are derived by requiring
consumers who gain from lower prices to actually transfer income until those
who would otherwise lose from higher prices are indifferent between stability
and instability. Enforcing compensation transforms the welfare measures into
ordinal comparisons of compensated demand or expenditure functions. The
derived criteria are powerful and simple to use. Path dependence properties
of surplus measures are avoided by completely defining the time paths of
prices and income, and while compensations are usually exogenously granted
income variations, compensations in the new criteria are endogenously
35
determined. Thus, once functional forms for price changes and a demand
system are empirically estimated, compensation is known and compensated
demands can be computed•
Finally, nonneutral time preferences are introduced. Consumers with an
affinity for the present will tend to prefer currently low but rising prices.
Consumers with an affinity for the future will tend to prefer currently high
and falling prices.
Iowa State University
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